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Summary  findings
North (1984) argues that it is not the cost of transport  become representatives  by virtue of appointment to their
but the cost of transactions  that prevents economies from  present position.
realizing  well-being  - and that institutions matter  Campos and Lien construct a two-stage  incomplete
because  they affect the costs of transactions.  information  game model with two identical  firms and
Campos and Lien analyzc  the role of the deliberation  various links to real-world processes.  It is a highly
council - an institution common to most of the high-  simplified  model that focuses  on the awarding of
performing  Asian economics  - in reducing  the crippling  government  contracts.
effect of rent-seeking.  They use the model to gain insight into the problem of
A deliberation  council is a consultative  committee  rent-sceking  in developing  countries and to test their
whose members indude high-ranking  government  hypothesis.  Rent-sceking  occurs  pardy because  people
officials  and representatives  from the private sector-  are uncertain about the intentions and plans of potential
usually  from industry (especially  big business)  and  competitors  - they engage in rent-seeking for fear that
academia, sometimes  from consumer  groups and labor.  not doing so might giv: their competitors a huge
Councils can be organized  by industry or sector (as with  advantage. To the extent chat the council generates  an
the Industrial Structure Council in Japan) or by themc or  exchange  of information, this uncertainty is reduced, so
function (as with Thailand's Joint Public Scctor-Private  onC  wouid expect less rent-seeking.  Such exchanges
Sector Consultative  Committee).  reduce infonnation (transaction)  costs and thus improve
Generally the delibeation  council has a qukisi-  cfficicncy.
legislative  authority, and policies cannot be introduced  The model  confirms that firms are better off if they
or changed without its recommendation  and approval.  can communicate  their true valuations to competitors
Unlike  a legislative  committee,  its private sector  than when they cannot. The deliberation  council induces
representatives  are not elected but are chosen (by  participants to reveal true information,  and the model
industry or labor, for example,  and nor necessarily  shows  that the payoffs  are better with conmmunication
through voting) and its government officials  generally  thani  without
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Introduction
The high performing Asian economies have caught the attention of scholars, researchers,
policy makers, and practitioners  world wide.  Their historically unprecedented  performance
has generated enormous interest in their economic policies. But whiile  their success mighit  be
attributed to such policies, the role of institutions in these countries cannot be ignor-ed. Without
adequate supporting institutions, the very policies that have made these countries relatively wealthy
could not have been properly implemented. Like many other developing countries, import
substitution, export promotion, industrial transformation  could have led to debilitating rent-seeking
(Lai, 1985; Krueger, 1976; Bates, 1981; Bardhan, 1984). The Miracle materialized because
institutions were established to facilitate the implementation  of economically  desirable policies.
Institutions perform the crucial function of mediating between rulers and their constituents
and of governing relations among the constituents. As North (1984) has often argued, institutions
matter.  Why? They matter because.  they affect the costs of trasactions  among parties -
government and the polity on the one hand and different private sector parties on the other.  'It  is
not transport costs but the costs of transacting that are the key obstacles that prevent economies and
societies from realizing well-being. We can understand  why when we examine analytically the
costs of transacting ir. different situations."'  In this brief paper, we wish to analyze one feature of
an institution that has permneated  policymaking in several of the successful East Asian economies -
the deliberation council. 2 This feature relates to the council's role in reducing the crippling effect
of rent-seeking.
A deliberation council is a consultative  committee whose membership consists of high
L North (1985), p.3.
2  We define  an institution  as a set of rules and norms  that govern  a given  set of individuals. For
example,  the U.S. Congress  is an institutionr  v.ith  a variety  of rules and norms  that bind elected  legislators.
Similarly, a deliberation councilI  has  -a well-defined memnbership  governed by a set of rules and norms.3
ranking government officials and representatives from the private sector.  The latter normally
include representatives from industry, usualljy  big business, and academia; in some instances,
consumer groups and labor representatives also participate. A council can be organized along
indlustry/scectoral  lines, e.g. the Industry Rationalization Council in Japan, or along
thematictfunctional lines, e.g. the Joint Public Sector - Private Sector Consultative Committee in
Thailand.  It differs from typical consultative comnmittees  in other developing countries in its
influence on policymaking.  Unlike the typical consultative committee a deliberation council has
quasi-legislative authority over matters within its jurisdiction and meets regularly (Canmpos  and
Root,  1994).  It can be roughly equated with a committee or subcommittee in a western type
legislature.  Like the latter, it represents the interests of individuals and groups affected by the
policies over which it has jurisdiction and it r-ecommends  appropriate policies.  Furthermore, it
enjoys a first mover advantage in the sense that policies cannot be introduced or changed without its
recommendation and approval.  Unilike  a legislative committee however its private sector
representatives are not elected but are selected by the various groups involved, e.g. industry and
labor, according to rules that are not necessarily based on some type of voting schemne,  and the
government officials become representatives generally by virtue of their appointment to their current
position.
Because it carries some authority over a subset of policies, a council draws active
participation from private sector agents whose well-being may be affected by those policies.  Hence,
it provides a formal venue through which concerned groups and individuals can exchange
information and views on a limited1  set. of topics.  This has important implications for rent-seeking.
Rent-seeking occurs in part because individuals and groups are uncertain about the intentions and
planned actions of potential competitors.  This uncertainty leads them to engage in rent-seeking for
fear that not doing so might grive  competitors a huge advantage.  Because the council induces an4
exchange of infonnation, this unc-ertainty  is reduced: cut throat rent-seeking competition is
avoided.'  Consequently, with a council, one would expect the extent of rent-seeking to be lower.
In the language of the institutional economist, a council reduces the information (transactions) costs
and thus improves efficiency.
Because it is difficult to estimate the real cost of rent-seeking, it would be nearly impossible
to obtain data and evidence to validate our hypothesis.  Several interviews withi  participants in some
of these councils certainly indicate that the introduction of councils has transformed "under the table
dealings" into "over the table" transactions.'  But of course these are a small number of
observations and for that matter are subjective.  One alternative for increasing one's confidence in
the validity of the hypothesis is to construct a reasonably representative analytical model and to
determine whether or not the hypothesis can be deduced as an implication of the model.  We
attemnpt  to pursue this line in this paper.  In the following section, we develop the analytical model
and derive the equilibrium- In the second section, we then discuss the implications of the model for
rent-seeking.  We conclude with some remnarks  on fuirthier  research.
The Analytical  Model
To underpin the analysis, we construct a two stage incomplete informnation  game with two
identical firms. 5 At various steps of the building process, we will provide linkages with real world
processes.  The idea is to use the model to provide an insight into the problem of rent-seeking in
developing countries.
' Tis  does not mean that there is no competition. In the Japanese  case for instance  there has been
extensive  competition  in industries  that appear  to be cartels (see for instance  Yamaamura,  1985).
'~  interviews  were conducted  by Campos  in 1992.
s  We could have a more  general case  with n firnns.  But this would  not add much to our understanding
of the basic problem  we wish to investigate. It would shed light on problems  of second order in magnitude.The scenario is as follows.  In the first stage, the government announces a project and each
firm computes the value of the project to it  - how much is the project worth to the firm?  The
project could for example represent the building of a bridge or the provision of food and beverage
service fir  the state owned international airport.  We let v 1 be the value to firn  i of the project.
Neither firmn  knows the true valuation of the other.  This could be because each firm is controlled by
rival families whose loyalties are divided along regional lines so communication is difficult and
costly.  Or it could simply be that each mistrusts the other.
However, each finn knows the probability and cumulative density function of vi.  That is,
based on its experience in the industry, it has an idea of how v; corresponds to different situations
and the probability at which each situation occurs.  Let the functions be g( ) and G(  ) respectively.
One can think of these functions as industry rather than firm specific.
Each finn must decide whether or not to participate in this project.  Participation requires
payment of an access fee of M.  This might be interpreted as the cost of finding the right person in
govemment who can connect the firm with the people in charge of the project.  For example, one
firm might approach the son of the President, another might go through the Senate President, and
still another through the Finance Minister.  If neither firm decides to participate then govemment
officials award the project on a random basis without knowing the valuation of either finn-i
Participation is no guarantee that the firm will indeed get the project.  In practice more often
than not, a firm also has to expend some rent-seeking effort to bid for the project  This can be
6  The  rationale for this might be that low paid officials  do not want to incur the cost of evaluating
individual  firm capabilities  without  a corresponding  side payment.6
interpreted as the resources needed to obtain  a favorable judgment  from government officials in
charge of the project.  To capture  this fact, we construct a second stage to the game.  In this stage,
each participating firm has informnation  about the valuation of both firms ( possibly thmouglh  the
information exchange of the two middlemen through whom the firms connect with the people in
charge of the project ) and must decide on how much rent-seeking effort to expend.  Thie  project is
awarded to the fimi that expends the most effort.  We denote the rent-seeking effort by v.
Thze  Equilibrium
To solve this game, we start with the end game, i.e. the second stage, and then, given the
solution to the end game, go on to derive the solution to the first stage game.  By a solution we
mean the equilibrium strategy of each firm and the expected payoff given these strategies.
T'here are four possible evirnts that could occur in the second stage: both firms participate;
ftnn  I participates and firm 2 does not;, firm 2 participates and flirm I does not; both firms opt out.
The expec-ted  payoff-s  to each firm under each of the events differ depending on whether v, > v. or
V, <  v 2.?  Let us consider the first case, v,  > v 2.
For the first event, it can be shown, a la Hiliman and SaTnet  (19S7), that the Nash
equilibrium is a paijr  of mixed strategies such that firm I expends any effort vt with equal probability
(Ily1)  and firm 2 any effort v with equal probability (W1vO.  The expected payoff to firm I and firm
2, given v1> v, are [v 1 - v, - M] and (-M), respectively. The expected payoffi to each under the
other events can be easily calculated.  The expected payoffs for all four events are indicated in table
7  In the case  of vt,  = vt 2, both firms receive  an expected  payoff  of (v,12)  in equilibrium.  But since  v, and
v. 2 are drawn from a continuous  distribution,  this case has zero probability. Henceforth  we shall disregard  it.7
la.  Similar  calculations  can  be  made  to derive  the  payoffs  under case 2.  These are indicated in
table l b.
Table Ila
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To solve the first stage game, we have to know more about the information structure of the
game.  We consider two possible situations. in one no communication  is 2ossible between the two
firms; in the other, communication  of true valuations is  ossible.'  Let us start with the first
situation. This involves a game of incomplete information. The equilibrium concept we will use is
the Bayesian-Nash type.
We start with the following proposed strategy of firm i: participate, i.e. pay M, if v1> v1'
and not participate otherwise. The constant v 1' represents a trigger point determined es-ante; by
coinstruction,  vj* <ti.  We assume that each firm knows that the other will follow this strategy.  We
w%ill  show that this strategy is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. To do so we first analyze firm l's
situation.  To follow the argument it is important  to keep in mind that each fimn makes its
calculations and formulates its strategy ex-ante, i.e. before the game actually begins.
Recall that in the first stage firm I is able to determine its valuation v 1 once the government
announces the project  It knows the strategy of finn. 2: participate if v. > v2 ; otherwise, do not  It
also knows go and G().  Hence, it can compute its expeced return given firm 2's strategy and its
own valuation.  It treats v2* as a parameter and v, as a variable whose value it will know once the
game smtat, i.e. the government announces a project. In this stage firm 1 must decide whether to
participate,  or not  Suppose it decides to participate. There are two possible cases it must consider:
(a) v, <v2` and (b) v, Ž!  v.'
For case (a), the expected payoff (derived in part fr-om  tables la and ib)  is,
D  Under reasonable conditions,  the case in which  each fim strategically reveals the wrong  information
is equivalent to the case with no communication;  Sobel (1992).9
I  =,  -M fu( 2 d 2 g( 1 M  g(v 2 dv.(la)
0
ad  for case (b) it is,
7:,,=f  (v 1-v,-M)g(v2)dv2+f(-M)ug(v 2)dv 2+(v3--M)fg(v 2 )dV2. lb
o
AAler  some algebrnic manipulaton, the two reduce to,
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Suppose,  instead firm I decides not to participate. Then its expected paYoff  is,
V2~I
:,la =f  (Mrg2)u(v 2 ) d+  2  2 G  (v2f)  (3)
0
Given vd <v2 then firn  I  will partcipate if and only ifit  - ;o>  0.  fv 1 Ž  2 then it will
participate if and only if  mali,  -ula>  0.  From equations (2a), (2b), and (3) above, we know that
71 atlo  - M  (4a) and=  l  (  2  =(v2
and10
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It can be shown that (4a) and  (4b3  are incroasing  in vi and aro equRI  in value  at  v;.  That  is,
1c  710  =  9 la  10 la  i  V3  <  V2
193  10  :Lb  'RI  VI  if  sf  V2
With ;CI  - 710 continuous  at v2, and increasing  in v 1.9 A similar  solution  can be derived  for firm  2
following  the same steps. This  yields  7C 2 - 7C20.
Note that in equilibrium,  7;,  - 7iln  = O  at v1 (given  vf'): for any value v 1 > V 1 I,wc  X  -CIO > O; firm 1
would not want a trigger  point that yields negative  expected  payoffs  or one that eliminates  some
instances  of positive  payoffs. Similarly,  n2  - = 0 at v2' (given v,).  Hence,  we have two
equations  in two unknowns, v,  and v2'.  The implicit  fimction  theorem  guarantees  the existence of a
solution.  Note that because the two firms are symmetric, v 1 = v2  = v  in equilibrium. This implies,
from (4a), that (v'/2) G(v)  = M.
It can be shown that the expected payoff (for the game) to either firm at the Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium is,
9 At v 1 = V,, (7cb- ;Jo)  becomes  (v:2/2)  G(vY)  - M, which is equal  tO (71,  - S,O  Moreover,  dc 1 ,. - ;D10)
/ dv 1 = G(vf) / 2 > 0:  WhereaS  d(7lb - ;,,)  / dv 1 = vig(v) + G(v 1) - v,g(v,) - G(v2) /2  = G(v,)  - G(v2f)  /2  2
G(v)  /2 > 0 when v, >v2..r ~  ~~  V  V.  'Tr  .v.'
11
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f  f  (v)g(2gv)vdl  (v.20(2)(ld2v
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After some manipulation, it can be shown that
7  f  G-  ( f  Cv,)  dv,)  G(v)  + f  G(v2)  (1  - G(v2)  dv 2. (5)
0  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~V.
To calculate the payoffs, we must make some assumptions regarding G( ).  For tratability,
we assume that G(v) = (v/v) when v £ [0,V],  i.e. v, and v 2 are unifonnly distributed.  This implies,
that v'  =  (2iM)'N.  To ensure an interior solution, we assume M < (V/2)  so that v' s v. Upon
substituting v  into equation (5), we derive
=(.;C)  12  (  v_)2(
7C  V.  ~~~)'  0.  (6)
Note that there is no presumption here about what each firm actually does.  This depends on its
valuation vfr  which is revealed upon the government's announcement of the project, and on its
trigger point v;,  which it calculates ex ante.
Now suppose that the two firms could communicate their true valuations.  Assume v, > v2
(similar results apply for the reverse case given symmetry).  We can derive the equilibrium
strategies for each of the three possible cases from tables la and lb.  These are:
Case r. The equilibrium strategy is (NN).  Neither firm participates if either (i) v1/2 < v. < v, < 2M,
or (ii) M > v,/2 >  vz.12
Case 1I. The equilibrium strategy is MRN). Herein firm I participates and thus expends rent-seeking
effort but finn 2 does not.  This happens if either (i) v1/2 > v 2 and v,/2 > M, or (ii) v1 >  v2 > VI 1 2  />
M and v  - v2 >M,or (iii) v 1 > v. 2 >v 1 12> M >V 2/2and  v,-v,<.M.
Case Ill. When V, >  v2 > v2/2 > v2/2> M and v,-V 2 <M,  the equilibrium is characterized by a pair
of mixed strategies. In this case firmn  I engages in rent-seeking with probability (v, -2M)f(2v2rv,);
finn 2 engages in rent-seek-ing  with probability(v 272M)1v 2.
We can now deduce that the expected payoff to both firns  with communication is greater
tha  the expected payoff without communication- To do so, we first characterize the three cases.
This is done in Figure 1.  Note first that since M < (V/2), the line with vj/2 = v2 will intersect the v,
.v  +  M  line from above.  From  Figure  1, we  have
AREA (I)  2M 2
AREAQ(I)2M  (-  -2M) +(1I2)  (vi- 3M)=  (1)  (v-M-W
AREA  (I.  1=M(v-(5/2)M
Note also that the probabilities for Case  (,  II, arid HI are equal to the coanesponding  areas
divided by  i2. Given symmetry, a similar argument can be made for the case in which v, <  v 2 .
Given the probabilities and the payoffs to each firm under each of the three cases, we can
show that the expected payoff for either firm is greater than
AREA  :L  2  2M  (  v  5)







the expected payoff for Case I[and 11.1  After further algebmaic  manipulation, we can show that B
= (1/4) v-> (1/6) ;~> nt where 7% is the expected payoff with no communication.  Thus both firms are
better off with communication.
Implications  or the Model
The model discussed above is highly simplified and focuses on the awarding of govenment
projects.  But it does drive home the point we made in the introduction.  There is likely to be less
resources lost to rent-seeking if competing parties can exchange (true) infonnation.  The model
shows that firms are better off if they can communicate their true valuations to competitors relative
to a situation in which they cannot.  That is, their expected net payoffs are higher.  Since the cost to
each consists of the access fee and the rent-seeking effort and since the access fee is the same
whether or not there is communication between the two finns, it follows that rent-seeking costs
m.ust be lower for each in the case where the two firms can communicate (at least in an expected
value sense).
A key then to reducing rent-seeking is to make it possible for competing parties to obtain
true information about their rivals. The deliberation council is one possible mechanism that can be
used to this end. As mentioned earlier, this institution provides a formnal  channel for competing
groups to exchange information. Several reinforcing factors induce  participants to reveal their true
information. First, because a council has real authority, it has value to private sector participants.
The model suggests this. The equilibria above show that the expected payoffs with  communication
is greater than the payoffs in the case with no communication. Intuitively, each firm can know more
about the possible actions of its competitors and can thus make better decisions- Hence, each will
be inclined to support the creation of a council and to participate actively in it-
10  We assume  that M < (V13).  Intuitively,  what this mearis  is that the access  fee must not be too large.14
Second, since members meet regularly, there is an element of repeat play.  As much of the
literature on repeated games suggest, this encourages cooperation. Third, government officials have
the power to eject private sector participants if found to have revealed misleading or have failed to
reveal useflul  information  - such deviations are likely to be discovered in subsequent meetings."
In turn, government officials have the incentive to reveal their true information for failure to do so
would undermine the value of the council which could lead to the council's demise.  The
government would then have more difficulty obtaining information and getting the different parties
to agree on policies.
Concluding  Remarks
The paper has tried to address a puzzling feature of the economic development of the high
performing Asian economies: why did rent-seeking seem to have been less problematic in these
countries?  We have suggested that one institution, the deliberation council, has helped mute rent-
seeking in these countries by allowing concerned groups to exchange information and to use that
information constructively.' 2 This should come as no surprise since rent-seeking tends to occur less
when rules, procedures, and actions are more transparent and when affected parties have recourse to
deviant actions.
The more important message of this paper is that institutions that reduce transactions costs
need to be established in order to speed up the process of growth.  Development requires markets
and markets involve contracts of some sort or another.  And whenever there are contracts, there are
"  For this reason, it is important  that the bureaucracy be relatively powerfil and reputable - powerful
to be able to enforce  the rules and reputable to obtain the respect of private sector participants. The bureaucracy
in this context  is like a referee  of a game. If the referee  is weak and incompetent  and if (s)he lacks  impartiality,
the game easily loses its value to the contestants.
12  We do not claim  that this is the only reason. Campos  and Root (1994)  give other reasons.15
possibilities for opportunistic behavior.  An important role of institutions in economic development
is to inhibit opportunism.  Opportunism reduces investment and thus retards growth.
In an Arrow-Debreu world, efficiency is achieved because all possible contingencies can be
written into a contract.  But, as Williamson (1985) has argued, bounded rationality makes this
impossible.  Hence, parties to a contract are often faced with the problem of opportunism.  If an
unforeseen event occurs one or more parties to the contract could easily renege.  The solution must
be some form of credible commitment that make it in the self-interest of parties not to renege.
Good institutions perforn  a commitment role.
In the process of development the most significant contracts are the implicit social contracts
between the state and the polity, and among them, those between the state and business sector.  The
latter are the key to inducing long term investments.  If potential investors cannot be certain about
the sustainability of policies, they are unlikely to invest in long term projects.  Changes in policies
that are uncalled for, opportunistic behavior on the part of government, are likely to reduce the
value of investments whose returns are based on existing policies.  Rent-seeking tends to engender
such changes in policies, changes that tend to fhvor some parties over others.  Hence, it tends to
discourage investment.  By reducing the value of rent-seeking, a deliberation council indirectly
performs a commitment function: less rent-seeking implies a more rational and stable policy
environment.' 3
The council is but one example of an institution performing a commitment function in the
service of economic development  There are undoubtedly many others to be found in the historical
experience not only of the high performing Asian economies but also of the West beginning with
13  The council perforns a more direct commitment  function. Because it has some veto power over
policies  that affect its private  sector  participants,  it gives the participants  some confidence  that these  policies  will
not be altered  arbitrarily.  In Williamson's  tenninology (1994), it is a governance structure that  limits the
possibilities for ex-post opportunism on the part of the government  This feature of the council as well as others
are discussed more extensively in Campos and Root (1994).16
the industrial revolution in England.  It would be extremely helpful to policy makers and
development practitioners if specific institutions with similar features can be found in both sets of
countries for this would suggest some basic principles upon which to build growth promoting
institutions." 4 For policy makers and practitioners, the main problem is not so much wliat policies
to adopt but what institutions to create or promote in order to facilitate the implementation and
sustainability of desirable economic policies.
14  There  has been some initial  work  on the Western  economies  -see  for instance North and Weingast
(1989),  Root (1988),  Weingast  (1992)  and Milgrom,  North,  and Weingast  (1990)  and on East Asia  - Campos
and Root (1994).17
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